Introduction
Over the past several decades, computational models have played an increasingly important role in the developmental literature. Among these, connectionist models stand out as offering some of the most exciting (and also controversial) insights into cognitive development. The controversy has for the most part been healthy, and has stimulated new research that has led to important empirical discoveries. More recently, as the modeling work has matured, the relationship between neuralnetwork models and other computational approachesincluding Bayesian models, information-theoretic analyses, statistical learning, among others -has helped to reveal the deeper computational principles at work.
So what have we learned from these models? And what phenomena remain to be explored? The goal of the present article is to present a critical -and admittedly, very personal -review of what I believe have been the major advances that have come from attempts to model developmental phenomena (for additional reviews of the modeling literature, see [1, [2] [3] [4] ). My assessment is positive. But I will also argue that important new challenges exist. The work to be done might be tougher, but will provide a greater yield.
What have we learned?
We have learned a great deal about development from computational modeling, and more than can be covered in this review. I therefore focus on what I see as some of the central issues: (1) explaining the shape of change; (2) new views on how knowledge may be represented; (3) the richness of experience.
The shape of change The simplest and possibly most natural pattern of development might seem to be one in which, over time, performance increases in a linear fashion. In fact, very few developmental patterns illustrate such linear tendencies. Development usually proceeds in fits and spurts, sometimes interrupted by long periods where little appears to change, and even sometimes by periods where performance temporarily deteriorates.
Noteworthy examples of such nonlinearities abound in the realm of language acquisition, and have played a major role in theorizing about the mechanisms that make language acquisition possible. The special ability of children to learn languages (during a Critical Period) motivated the hypothesis of a specialized neural mechanism, the Language Acquisition Device, that operates only during childhood [5] . The rapid increases in word comprehension, production, and knowledge of grammar that occur in young children during their second year of life have led many theorists to conclude that these bursts arise because something new has appeared in the child.
In non-linguistic domains, the apparent stage-like changes in children's behavior (e.g. with balance-beam problems, in which children are shown a see-saw device with two weights at opposite sides of a fulcrum, and are asked which side, if either, will go down) has encouraged the supposition that children are passing through qualitatively different stages of cognitive development. And most dramatic of all are so-called 'U-shaped' performance curves. Perhaps the best known, and theoretically most consequential, has involved the acquisition of the English past tense. The temporary decline in correct performance, characterized by what looks like over-application of the 'add -ed' pattern, has seemed to many to provide dramatic evidence for the psychological reality of rules. Computational models have been proposed that offer alternative interpretations for all of these phenomena. The Critical Period and stage-like learning. McClelland and colleagues [6, 7] demonstrated that critical period effects for phoneme perception could be achieved in a neural network, even when the mechanism underlying learning remained unchanged. O'Reilly and Johnson [8] found similar effects in a model of imprinting in chicks. Marchman [9] obtained a similar result in networks that learned the past-tense mapping, and found that the greater plasticity in 'young' networks allowed them to recover from artificial lesions to a much greater extent than when the lesions occurred later in learning. The implication here is that even when the learning mechanism remains constant, the cumulative effects of learning can result in entrenchment, and this reduces the plasticity of the system [4, 10] .
A second possibility (not necessarily incompatible with the first) has been proposed by Newport [11] and Elman [12] . In these models, the advantages of a critical period for language learning result -counterintuitively -from processing limitations that occur in early childhood (see also [13, 14] for related accounts). In addition to suggesting alternative hypotheses for important developmental phenomena, many of these models have led to empirical research that appears to support their predictions (e.g. [6, 7, 15, 16] ).
Stage-like effects in learning the balance-beam problem can be shown to arise naturally in neural networks as a consequence of simple nonlinearities in the response functions of processing units, because small quantitative changes in a learning system can lead to qualitative changes in behavior [17] . Appearance of the latter might not be evidence that a new internal mechanism has appeared on the scene.
However, the actual empirical data regarding the balance-beam problem are more complex than initially described. Children's performance is quite variable, both for an individual child and across ages, and performance can be affected by perceptual variables. Symbolic approaches have difficulty accounting for such effects. A class of models known as 'cascade correlation networks', in which development is modeled by a gradual increase in processing resources, turns out to capture these and other subtleties quite nicely [18] . U-shaped curves. Even more striking than nonlinear changes in behavior is when development actually appears to suffer a temporary decline. Probably the best known example of this is the U-shaped performance curve associated with children's learning of the English past tense. Although this has seemed to many to be a prima facie example for the acquisition of a rule, Rumelhart and McClelland [19] were able to show through simulation that U-shaped behaviors might arise in the course of itembased learning. That is, the process of abstraction and generalization need not involve symbolic rules, and nonmonotonic changes in performance can be a consequence of the statistical structure of the domain to be learned and the incremental nature of learning [20] .
Rumelhart and McClelland's proposal that neural networks provide an alternative to symbolic rules has remained controversial. It has also been enormously productive and has stimulated a large body of researchboth computational and behavioral -that has considerably refined our understanding of U-shaped behaviors [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] . Indeed, many of the studies that will be discussed in the remainder of this paper were motivated by issues raised in Rumelhart and McClelland's seminal work.
New views about how knowledge can be represented
In symbolic theories, representations are typically discrete in form and all-or-nothing in functionality. This reflects what has been called the 'algebraic mind' [31] . Yet there are many examples, both in development and adult behavior, in which behavior seems to suggest a richer view of what it means to know something. Consider the variability displayed by children in balance-beam and conservation tasks, where behavior often depends crucially on task variables [32, 33] . Such behavior is not easily accommodated by symbolic representations and deterministic processing.
Computational models have been particularly useful in suggesting new ways to think about the source and form of knowledge. One example concerns the apparent paradox in which very young children seem to possess knowledge about the existence of hidden objects in one task, yet in another task in which this knowledge must be used more actively, appear no longer to be aware of its existence. Munakata and colleagues explored such behavior both experimentally as well as through computational simulations [34, 35] . The simulations led to a mechanistic account for what one might call 'partial knowledge', and to insights regarding a distinction between latent and active representations.
Another major contribution has come from models that have emphasized dynamical systems theory (e.g. [36] ). These models downplayed the role of explicit representations, and have provided alternative ways to think about how computation might be accomplished by means of dynamics that operate on non-representational internal states.
Just what can be learned from the input?
One of the most contentious areas in development has surrounded the notion that some knowledge must be innate. Although innate knowledge has been claimed for many domains, it has been developed in its most explicit form in the area of language, from what is known as the 'Poverty of the Stimulus' (PoS) hypothesis [37, [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] . The basic claim is that the input available to children underdetermines what they will eventually come to know about language. A related argument in favor of the 'algebraic mind' has been that connectionist networks are unable to generalize beyond their immediate experience, suggesting that mental processing is both symbolic and benefits from 'pre-knowledge' [31] .
It is clear that something about human biology is essential to learning language (despite impressive demonstrations of non-human primates' communication skills, no non-human comes anywhere close to mastering human language). A crucial question then is what it is that is species-specific -is it also domain-specific, specialized knowledge that subserves only language? And is it the ability for symbol processing? Or does language emerge as a consequence of multiple phenotypic modifications that are not in themselves specific to language but which collectively make language possible [2, [43] [44] [45] ? Can language be processed by non-symbolic mechanisms? Models have been especially important in fleshing out such an emergentist position by demonstrating ways in which non-domain specific constraints can interact in ways that yield domain-specific outcomes [46] [47] [48] .
A more direct response to PoS claims has been to test directly the question of what information is available in Review the input to children by seeing what a computational model can learn, given input of the sort that a child might be expected to encounter. Word segmentation. One of the very earliest things an infant must learn is to identify the words of her languagenot only what they are, but where they are in the speech stream. Unlike written language, there is no 'white space' in spoken language that delimits words. How then might a child learn words, if even their location is opaque?
Several computation approaches have converged on a similar insight, which is that, at least to a first approximation, sequences of sounds that are highly associated are good candidates to be words. The manner in which this hypothesis is implemented varies [49] [50] [51] but the essential idea is that word boundaries are locations where the conditional probability of the next sound, given what has preceded it, is low. A network (or child) that attempts to anticipate what it (she) will hear next will tend to do worse at the onsets of words, and better as more of a word is heard. Error maxima thus constitute likely word boundaries. Learning categories. A related problem, at a somewhat higher level of abstraction, is determining the syntactic and semantic categories of words. Here again, strong claims have been advanced that categories cannot be induced but must be innately given [40] . The claim is that a strategy that relies on distributional information available to a child (e.g. words in the same category tend to have similar distributional properties) will fail given the complexity of real language input. However, several computational models have suggested otherwise [52] [53] [54] [55] . Again, these models differ in their details, but share the same insight that a word's privilege of occurrence is a powerful indicator of its category. Importantly, there is a growing empirical literature involving learning of artificial languages by infants and young children that is highly consistent with the type of learning embodied in the computational models (see [56, 57] for discussion of this work].
But it is in the realm of syntax that the PoS claim has been most vigorously advanced, and which potentially present the most significant challenges for models that emphasize learning. One problem involves the role of negative evidence regarding ungrammatical sentences. It has been claimed that such information is necessary for children to know when to retract incorrect over-generalizations; but children rarely receive this sort of information. In other words, without such information, children have no way of knowing whether a gap in their experience is accidental, or is systematic (i.e. reflects an ungrammaticality). However, models that follow Bayesian principles of inference (e.g. [58] [59] [60] ) are often able to circumvent this problem by evaluating a gap in experience with respect to its predicted likelihood, and adjusting generalizations so that they are sensitive to the probability that the gap was accidental versus systematic. Learning the structure of language. Another challenge in the area of syntax concerns the ability to learn compositional and hierarchical structure. This also has been claimed to be unlearnable from positive data alone, but there are several models that successfully do just this (e.g. [12, 61, 62] ).
One important problem often held up as the 'parade case' of innate knowledge is the so-called phenomenon of Aux inversion [38] . This involves patterns of the sort shown in question/answer pairs such as 'Is Mary happy?'/ 'Mary is happy'. Given such data, a child might be tempted to infer that questions are formed from declaratives by inverting the order of the subject noun and auxiliary (or modal). But this generalization incorrectly predicts that the interrogative that corresponds to 'The boy who is smoking is crazy' should be (the ungrammatical) 'Is the boy who smoking crazy?'
The fact that children do not make such errors has been interpreted as evidence that crucial knowledge about the structure sensitivity of grammatical rules must be innate [38] . However, Lewis and Elman [63] demonstrated that a neural network trained on examples of well-formed sentences that mimicked the types and frequencies of sentences found in real language could in fact learn the correct form of complex interrogatives. This happens because there are many other sentences present in the input (to children as well as to these networks) that provided evidence of a set of interacting generalizations which, taken together, allow the network to expect complex sentences of the sort it has never before seen. The important lesson from this is to expand our notion about what counts as positive evidence. To the extent that language behavior reflects interactions of multiple generalizations, networks appear able to learn not only the separable generalizations, but also how to combine them in novel ways.
Summing up, the record is very positive. Connectionist models now offer alternative hypotheses for many important developmental phenomena, and in several cases, appear to provide a richer and more accurate account of those phenomena than hypotheses from behavioral work.
That said, I believe the field is now at a crossroads. To some extent, the modeling work has captured the lowlying fruit. This is not to minimize the accomplishments. What is to be done I suggest there remain two major challenges for developmental modeling. One concerns missing pieces: the phenomena that have not, by and large, been addressed. The second concerns strategy: taking development more seriously in a deeper and more profound way.
Missing pieces
To a large extent, computational models of development have focused on cognitive phenomena. There are important exceptions (e.g. [8, 46, 64, 65] ) but they are few in number. Little modeling has been done in the realm of social cognition (there is some work that looks at social interactions, but this tends to have an evolutionary focus, rather than developmental), and even less in the development of affect and emotion. Thus, the computational literature has yet to contribute much to our understanding of theory-of-mind phenomena, development of self-identity, let alone exotica such as the development of moral judgment or play. Until recently, there was little computational work in the area of conceptual learning, 'theory theory', and development of causal inference. Happily, these areas at least are now being addressed [66] .
The modeling literature has also had little to say about the role that is played by the child itself as an actor in the process of development. Children have their own agendas. They have drives, desires, things that draw their attention and things they ignore. Even young infants are not passive absorbers of external stimuli, completely at the mercy of their environment. Input is not the same as intake, and the effects of learning are obvious. Modeling the role of such endogenous forces is not intractable [67] but is far from easy.
Finally, although models of acquired neuropsychological disorders abound, much less has been done in the modeling of abnormal development. In my view, this reflects a bias on the part of modelers that is inherited from the developmental community, which is to consider cases of developmental disorders from the perspective of a broken adult system. But as Karmiloff-Smith, Thomas, and colleagues have pointed [68] [69] [70] , when something is 'broken' in infancy (or before), the course of development itself will be altered. The result may be an outcome that differs in profound ways from the typically developing child.
This does not mean that atypical development is uninformative about typical outcomes. Just the contrary is true: such cases offer valuable information about the cascading effects that events in early development have on later stages. Because such indirect effects are difficult to study, computational models should be especially important in exploring these complex and sometimes nonobvious interactions over time, as the few models that have taken this approach illustrate [71] [72] [73] [74] . The overall paucity of such models, however, leads to what I view as the more serious shortcoming in the current state of the modeling work, which is that we have yet to fully meet the challenge of taking development seriously.
Missing development
Connectionist models are, by and large, models of learning. There is good reason for this. We are profoundly adaptive creatures, and our experiences play a huge role in who we come to be. But the neonate who responds to a moving light is not the same creature as the toddler who learns names for things. The toddler, the older child, and the adolescent respond to the same experience in different ways. In other words, the child is a constantly changing target, and models in which learning is the only source of change run the risk of seriously missing the point.
An important source of the differences that appear in early life are maturational (using the term here to denote developmental changes that are primarily endogenous). To be sure, the neonate's view of the world is different from a two-year-old's in part because of differences in experience and learning But developmental differences in the maturity and anatomical spacing of photoreceptors in the retina also give the infant a view of the world that is literally different from that of the older child. This in turn can have important consequences for what is learned [64, 65] . Causal chains in development. A second factor to be taken into account is that the process of development itself involves a causal chain in which earlier stages shape and constrain what will happen at later stages, in ways that we have only begun to appreciate. The causal chain can be quite complex and have consequences both over time and across domains.
An excellent example of such a complex causal chain is suggested by the research of Karmiloff-Smith and colleagues, who have studied individuals with Williams Syndrome (WS). Both control subjects and WS individuals show superior recognition of upright faces, compared with upside-down faces. But in WS, this difference is attenuated: they are only slightly worse at recognizing upside down faces, and better than controls. One explanation might be that the 'face processing module' in those with WS is not working as it should. But the more likely account, proposed by Karmiloff-Smith and colleagues [68] , is more complex and far more interesting. It appears that WS individuals rely to a greater extent on featural rather than configural information. Why should this be? This feature-based strategy might arise from difficulties in focusing attention, which could itself be the result of difficulties in early infancy in controlling saccadic eye movements. On this hypothesis, a relatively specific deficit early in life has a cascading effect on subsequently acquired behaviors: very early difficulties controlling eye movements lead to difficulties in control of attention, which at a later stage leads to difficulties in integrating global information, leading to a greater reliance on featural information, which then mitigates the disadvantage that upside-down faces have relative to upright faces (which are normally perceived using configural cues). Development is a linked chain of cause/effect relationships. Importantly, these relationships cut across not only time but domains (see Figure 1) .
Or consider the question of where language comes from. One possibility is that language depends on neural machinery that is exclusive to itself, and on a set of isolated genes that have only to do with language. In this scenario, the acquisition process might still depend on external input to serve as a trigger (or possibly not; see [38] ). This story is relatively simple and straightforward.
Contrasted with this is the emergentist view, that language sits at the crossroads of a number (how many -a dozen? thirty?) of small phenotypic changes in our species that interact uniquely to yield language as the outcome [2, 43] . Here, language is seen as a domain-specific outcome that emerges through the interaction of multiple constraints, none of which is specific to language (see, for example, Figure 2 ). This is a harder story to tell because it means identifying, first, what those ingredients are; second, the ways in which they differ from non-human primates; and third, how exactly it is that they come together to make language possible. Crucially, these 'language ingredients' undoubtedly have interactions that occur over time, forming a causal chain, which may be difficult to untangle. It is precisely for such accounts that modeling plays a crucial role. But all of this means taking development more seriously. We have begun already to see examples of this, as in models of face recognition, imprinting, or aspects of visual development [8, 46, 64, 65] .
Conclusions
The above barely scratches the surface of where we need to go next. I would argue that we also need to explore the much richer interactions that occur between behaviors as they unfold over time. This is not an easy task and will require models of a scale and complexity that surpass current technology. The 'scaling problem' has often been the bane of modeling. Models that work in single domains might not easily scale up to more complex situations involving development across multiple domains. So building more complex models of development also means solving the scaling problem (see Box 1) .
Intriguingly, it may be that development itself provides some clues as to how to build more complex models. We begin, after all, as a single-celled organism. It is through development that we achieve the complexity of form and behavior that marks the mature individual -possibly as many as 100!10 12 cells, each with its own spatial location and connectivity, integrated within a machine of incredible complexity that only now and then do we barely Human language emerges when a set of language-enabling traits takes a specific form. The interactions of these traits then makes language possible.
understand. As we seek to model this process, we might also come to understand deeper principles about how complexity can arise from simple origins. In other words, development may be Nature's solution to its own scaling problem. Box 1. Questions for future research † Extending the range of domains. There remain several important areas of development for which little modeling work has been done and which provide exciting challenges for future research. These include social, emotional, physical and moral development, among many others.
† Multi-tasking. Most models focus on single behaviors. But to the extent that, in the developing child, behavior in one domain interacts with behavior in another, it will be important to have models that are capable of multi-tasking. † Scaling. Modeling typically begins by abstracting and simplifying a problem, so that irrelevant details are excluded from study. But in the real world children have to deal with these additional complexities. An important challenge will be to develop models that can scale up to deal with more realistic and detailed behaviors. † Cascading effects over time. Many complex behaviors are the result of cascading processes that depend on earlier stages of development, and which involve complex interactions between different domains. Modeling such interactions over time is the most important and exciting challenge of all, and clearly requires solutions to the first three challenges above.
